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NATIONAL LAWS ON SEABED EXPLOITATION:
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW*

Francisco Orrego Vicuna**
Since the beginning of United Nations' efforts to establish an
international system to regulate the exploration and exploitation of
mineral resources of the seabed lying beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, considerable legal controversy has arisen regarding the
rules of international law and their effect on the activities of interested
states. Two basic theses have been enunciated in that discussion. The
first, supported by countries interested in early exploitation, is that
international law in general, and the freedom of the high seas in
particular, permit any state to exploit the seabed notwithstanding the
absence of a convention defining an international regime. The second,
supported principally by developing countries, is that international
law, particularly in conjunction with its development by the United
Nations, permits such exploitation only within the framework of a
system embodied in an international convention.
This controversy has recently intensified as a result of individual
states' enactment of laws which provide for unilateral regulation of
seabed exploitation. The United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany have enacted such laws and other industrialized countries,
such as the United Kingdom, France and Japan, are also considering
similar initiatives.
The purpose of this article is to examine the present state of
international law regulating the use of the seabed and, in light
thereof, to discuss the legal implications of any national legislation on
the matter. To that end it is necessary to examine some aspects of the
historical evolution of the law of the sea, the work of the United
Nations, and the impact of national laws on other maritime activities.
I.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE

FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS

It is a well established part of customary international law that
freedom of the high seas is the fundamental principle governing mari-

* This article is an updated English version of one published originally in
French by the Annuaire Francaisede Droit International,XXIV, 1978.

** Director of the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile, and
Professor of International Law at the Law School of the said University. Vice-Chairman of the Delegation of Chile to the Law of the Sea Conference.
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time areas beyond national jurisdiction.' The difficulty lies in establishing the substance and precise scope of the principle in contemporary international law.
Historically this principle has found expression in law in essentially negative terms. Thus states were prohibited from interfering in
the utilization of the high seas, as was the case in the second part of
the Middle Ages. 2 Originally, then, the principle meant freedom of
navigation and freedom of exploitation. But soon the needs of the
international community caused a modification of this perspective.
Exceptions were made to absolute freedom of navigation. For example, piracy and the slave trade were repressed and the right of pursuit
3
was recognized.
The evolution of the freedom of exploitation of marine resources,
which originally involved only fisheries, was of even more significance. When toward the end of the 19th century it became apparent
that marine resources might be exhausted as a result of uncontrolled
exploitation, 4 the absolute freedom set forth in the principle was
subordinated; first, to the right of equal access by all states5 and then
later to the conservation measures which began to be introduced. 6
Recognition of this reality of limited resources led to important
changes in the content of the principle. Until that time, the status of
res communis only differed from the status of res nullius in that the
former did not permit appropriation of the high seas, but did nothing
to prevent excessive utilization. In response to the necessity of such
regulation, the concept of utilization for the general interest of the
international community began to emerge in quite different terms.
The emerging notion was that the use of the high seas would remain
open to all states but the right of access would be subordinated to the
general interest of all nations as regulated by the international community. No longer could use of the high seas be conceived of as serving
the exclusive interests of any one state. While the United Nations has

MAR

1. F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR LA UTILIZACiON Y CONSERVACiON DE LAS RIQUEZAS DEL
3 (1956).
2. Summary Records of the 2d Meeting, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 69,

U.N. Doe. AICN. 4/32. The preparation of this document has been attributed to
Gidel: H. Lauterpacht Sovereignty over submarineareas [1950] BR. H.Y.B. INT'L L.
408 n. 1.
3. U.N. Doc., supra note 2, at 70-72.
4. For historical manifestations of this concern, see GIDEL LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 439 (1932).
5. GARCIA-AMADOR supra note 1,

6.

GIDEL

supra note 4, at 437-41.

at 26-27.
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made it possible to give this tendency a precise definition, it was
already discernible at an earlier date.7
The notion of unrestricted freedom of the high seas was thus
subordinated first to that of the abuse of right, and next to a perspective of common use. The fact that this rule is part of international
customary law does not mean that it should be an immutable dogma,
rather its definition should be subject to adaptations and modifications required by new realities, as the history of its development
clearly shows.
When the United Nations first addressed problems related to the
seabed, the principle of the freedom of the high seas already had a
different meaning. Evolution of the concept further developed along
lines which followed the work of the United Nations. Although one
might discuss the manner in which the evolution of a concept takes
place, it is more important to determine the general historical meaning of a rule of law, and this meaning has been well established in the
case of the principle of freedom of the high seas.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS DEBATE AND

THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The question of the extent to which the rules of international law
were applicable to the seabed arose at the first deliberations of the
United Nations on the subject." Underlying this debate was concern
over whether the principle of the freedom of the high seas, in its
traditional sense, could hamper the development of a proposed international regime.
Two principal schools of thought were asserted in the debate.
The first supported the view that existing rules of international law
are unable to ensure the orderly exploitation of the seabed for the
benefit of mankind. In this regard, it was argued that the existing

7. Among other cases, the draft prepared by Strupp for the establishment of an
international organization and a regime of sea waters was conceived "with a view to
the most favorable utilization in the interest of the international community," and in
accordance "with the common interests of the international community," Annuaire
de l'Institut de Droit International. Gidel also referred to the emergence of the
concept of common interest by the end of the nineteenth century. U.N. Doe. supra
note 2, at 73.
8. For a study of the subject in international law, particularly in terms of the
Geneva Conventions, see Ad-Hoc Comm.: Legal Aspects . . . of the seabed . . .

Study by the Secretariat. U.N. Doc. A/A.C.135/19 (1968) and add. 1 (1968), and
add. 2 (1968).
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legal structure would lead to the appropriation of the seabed9 and
that applicable rules were lacking, as evidenced by the fact that
treaties did not generally cover the matter.' 0 It was also warned that
this situation might lead to the colonization of the seabed, which
would only exacerbate the differences between the developed and the
developing countries." Accordingly, the idea of freedom of exploitation without restrictions was rejected, as it was concluded that it
would result in conflict and confusion.' 2 It was stressed, furthermore, that although the basic principles of international law were
and
applicable to the area, they were too imprecise, rudimentary
3
them.'
perfect
to
necessary
be
would
it
and
general,
It was also suggested that international law should be applied in
a manner which served the guiding principles forming the concept of
the common heritage of mankind,' 4 or that it be applied only partially
or by analogy,' 5 or when the principles so provide.', Pursuing this
line, several delegations argued that in any case the freedom of the
high seas was inapplicable to the seabed area' 7 or that it could not be
applied mutatis mutandis.' It was also noted that the freedom of the
high seas does not imply freedom to exploit the area. 19 The thesis of a
lacuna in the law was also put forward, even though this question is
20
highly debatable in international law.
The second school of thought favored respect for the principle of
freedom of the high seas."' In many cases, however, this position was
not so much concerned with applying the principle to the seabed as it
was with the danger that the concept of the common heritage of
9. Malta. U.N. GAOR, First Committee (1515th mtg.) at 8,14 (1967). (References in this and the following notes are made to the Spanish version of the documents).
10. United Kingdom, Id. (1524th mtg.) at 3 (1967).
11. Libya, Id. (1525th mtg.) at 9 (1967).
12. Australia, Ad-Hoe Committee. U.N. Doc. A/A.C.135/W.C.1/SR.8 at 63

(1968).
13. Norway, Seabed Committee. U.N. Doe. A/A.C.138/SC.1/SR.8 at 82 (1969)

& SR.30 6 (1979).
14.
15.
16.
17.

Chile, U.N. Doc, A/A.C.138/SC.1/SR.8 at 82 (1969).
Peru, U.N. Doe. A/A.C.138/SC.IISR.20 at 115 (1969).
U.A.R., U.N. Doc. A/A.C.138/SC.1/SR.25 at 209 (1969).
Mexico, U.N. Doe. A/A.C.138tSC.1/SR.33 at 32 (1070). Brazil, U.N. Doc.

A/A.C.138/SR.19 at 17 (1970). Canada, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.138/SR.24 at 83 (1970).
18. Belgium, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.1381SC.1/SR.34 at 43 (1970) & Peru, at 49.
19. Brazil, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.138/SC.I/SR.5 at 45 (1969).
20. Mexico. Replies from governments. U.N. Doe. A/A.C.135/1 at 3 (1968).
21. For a summary of opinions in this sense by Canada, Philippines, France,
Greece, Japan, Norway, U.K. and U.S.S.R., Ad-Hoe Committee: Summary of opin-

ions oJ member States. U.N. Doc., A/A.C. 135/12 at 17 (1968).
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mankind, or rules which derive from it, might interfere with other
uses of the sea which are of interest to certain states. Thus, this school
of thought held new principles could be developed for the seabed
without affecting rules of international law applicable to other uses of
the sea.
Only a small number of countries favored the view that international law and the principle of the freedom of the high seas should be
applied directly to the seabed, without there being any need to develop additional principles. This was in particular the position of the
United States 22 and the Soviet Union, 23 though the latter's aim was
more to prevent the creation of a supranational organization and to
direct the discussions toward development of inter-governmental cooperation .24
For other countries the most important problem was to safeguard
the traditional uses of the sea. This position was expressed both by
reaffirmation of the view that international law, 25 or the interests of
other states, 26 must be kept in mind, and by reference to particular
uses that should be safeguarded by the application of international
law in force, such as the freedom to lay cables and pipelines, 27 seden-30
2
tary fisheries, 28 the freedom of navigation, and the freedom to fish.
The importance of this debate lies principally in its contribution
to the formation of a consensus on the inadequacy of traditional
international law. Even though at the beginning several delegations
22. The Delegation of the United States was of the opinion that both international law and the Charter of the United Nations should be applied to the seabed.
Seabed Committee, U.N. Doe. A/A.C.138/SC.1/SR.3, at 11 (1969). For the criticism
in the U.S. Congress regarding the concept of common heritage of mankind and
drafts which sought to impede any form of United Nations jurisdiction over the area,
Guenter Weisseberg International law meets the short-term national interest: the
Maltese proposalon the seabed and oceanfloor-its late in two cities. INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. at 42 (January 1969).
23. U.S.S.R. Ad-Hoe Committee. U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/SR.3. at 15-16 (1968).
Also: SR. 11, at (1968). See also, General Assembly, First Committee (1592d mtg.) at
9 (1968). See also Ukrania, General Assembly, First Committee, A/C.1/PV.1680, at
63 (1968).
24. U.S.S.R. Ad-Hoc Committee. U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/SR.12, at 22-23 (1969).
25. Roumania. General Assembly, First Committee (1596th mtg.) at 6 (Nov. 4,
1968). Canada, Id. (1599th mtg.) at 7 (Nov. 5, 1968).
26. Ad-Hoc Committee. Report A/7230 at 50-51 (1968).
27. France, General Assembly, First Committee (1526th mtg.) at 2-3 (Nov. 13,
1967).
28. Id. at 3. Ceylon, Id. at 12.
29. Greece. Replies from governments. U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/1. Add. 7, at 2
(1968).
30. Japan. Ad-Hoc Committee. U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/SR.5, at 33-34 (1968).
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expressed themselves with caution on the development of new principles and legal rules, 3' gradually the opinion prevailed that international law in force was not adequate to regulate exploitation of the
seabed from the point of view of the emerging concept of the common
heritage of mankind. 32 Resolution 2340 (XXII) had already anticipated this tendency by taking into consideration not only "the provisions" but also "the practice of the law of the sea". Resolution 2467
(XXIII) also stressed that approach to the problem when it made the
Committee on the Seabed responsible for "developing principles and
legal rules likely to further international cooperation with respect to
the exploitation and use of the seabed." The process culminated in the
Declaration of Principles of Resolution 2749 (XXV) which specifically
recognized "that the legal regime currently in existence for the high
seas does not contain rules of substance allowing regulation of explora33
tion of the aforementioned zone and exploitation of its resources."
It was to remedy the inadequacy of traditional international law
that the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles formally established the concept of the common heritage of mankind and laid the
foundation for an international regime. This concept is thus related to
international law in two ways. On the one hand, it brings together the
principles incorporated by the law of the sea in the course of its
evolution, such as the subordination of the absolute freedom of traditional law to the needs and limitations dictated by the needs of
conservation, the equal rights of other states, and the general interest
of the international community. On the other hand, the concept
represents an important step in the gradual development of international law, above all from the point of view of perfecting the principles and applying them specifically to the seabed.
Although there may be doubts as to when or how the principle of
the freedom of the high seas became a guiding principle for the
international community, such doubts are resolved by the Declaration
of Principles, at least concerning the seabed. The Declaration reflects
the consensus of the international community on the essential elements of the new legal regime applicable to the seabed. The concept
of the common heritage of mankind constitutes the synthesis of these
31. For a summary of opinions in this sense by Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria,
Canada, Ceylon, United Nations, Iceland, Italy, United Kingdom, Sweden,

U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, Ad-Hoc Committee. U.N. Doc. supra note 21 at 16-17.
32. For a study on this concept in the work of the United Nations, FANCISCO
OiuEco VIcu&A: Los FONDOS MARINOS Y OCkNICOS

(1976).

33. The texts of these and other relevant resolutions can be found in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (1972).

SHICERNODA
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elements. This also signifies the culmination of an enormously important stage in the evolution of the law of the sea.
The legal value and the binding character of the Declaration
have also been the subject of controversy. While some countries regard the Declaration as definitely binding in character, 34 others do
not, 35 and still others consider that it could only be applied until such
time as it was forcefully violated.3" It was also suggested that some
specific principles be declared binding, particularly that of peaceful
use, 37 or that all the principles be finally included in the international
3
convention .
The argument concerning the legal value of General Assembly
resolutions is not new. It has arisen each time an important resolution
has been adopted. It is quite obvious, however, that the resolutions
containing declarations of principles have a higher relative value, for
they express the consensus of the organized international community
on the fundamental aspects of the progressive development of international law. 39 In this regard, the resolutions have a precise juridical
value which obligates states to refrain from any activity contrary to
their content. Even if their binding character lacks enforcement
mechanisms or necessary sanctions, the simple application of the principle of good faith would lead to an identical conclusion.
In the particular case of Resolution 2749 (XXV), the fact that it
provides for the creation of an international regime and enforcement
machinery does not mean that its validity or its binding character are
contingent upon that regime. Its binding character exists from the
moment the Resolution was adopted, and that is sufficient justification to require each state to refrain from incompatible activities. Since
an early stage a number of delegations considered the common heritage of mankind as a new principle of jus cogens, a situation which

34. See, e.g. Mexico, Seabed Committee. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/SR.24, at

178 (1969).
35. See, e.g. Poland, Id. at 177. U.S.S.R. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.22, at 43
(1970). U.S.S.R., General Assembly, First Committee (1798th mtg.) A/C.1/PV.1798

at 32 (1970).
36. United Kingdom, General Assembly, First Committee (1799th mtg.) U.N.
Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799 at 6 (1970).
37. Czechoslovakia, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/12 supra note 21 at 15.
38. Report of the Committee, U.N. Doc. A/7622 A + 13 (1969).
39. On the legal effect of General Assembly Resolutions declaratory OE principles, see generally: O.Y. ASAMOAH THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
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which has been broadly debated at the Conference on the basis of a
proposal by Chile.40
III.

THE DECLARATION AND THE
SCOPE OF THE MORATORIUM

The United Nations discussions analyzed above had another important result. The concept of a moratorium was developed to prevent
the initiation of incompatible activities. This is also a fundamental
part of the legal framework involving the seabed which must be
considered.
At the time of the first debates on this subject, the thinking
concerning a moratorium was closely associated with the problem of
establishing a precise definition of the limits of national jurisdiction,
particularly in regard to the freezing of sovereignty claims in order to
forestall appropriation of the seabed. This line of analysis was based
on a broad interpretation of Article 1 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf. That initiation, however, was gradually separated
from the question of limits and shifted to the specific problems of
exploitation of the seabed zone.
It was the opinion of several delegations the status quo should be
maintained with respect to exploitation, 4' while emphasis was given
to the idea that neither individual nations nor international organiza42 It
tions could acquire rights on the basis of resource exploitation.
was also suggested that exclusive United Nations jurisdiction be de-

40. For early references see, Guyana, General Assembly, first committee (1788th
mtg.) U.N. Doc. AIC.1/PV.1788 at 9 (1970). India, Seabed Committee U.N. Doe.
A/AC.138/S.1/SR.20 303 (1971), Id., S.R.39 at 105 (1972). For a summary of opinions see also, Sri Lanka, Id., S.R. 64 at 9 (1973).
The Proposal by Chile originally introduced in Conference U.N. Doe. FC/14, Aug.
29, 1979 reads as follows:
The States' parties to the Present Convention accept and recognize on
behalf of the international community as a whole that the provision
relating to the common heritage of mankind set out in Article 136 is a pre
norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted
and which, consequently, can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
A compromise formula contained in Doc. A/Conf. 62/L.58 lead to paragraph 605
article 311, Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) U.N. Doe.
A/C62/WP.1OIREV3 (1980).
41. For a summary of opinion, U.N. Doe. supra, note 21, at 29-30.
42. Chile Ad-Hoe Committee U.N. Doe. A/AC135/W.G.2/SR.12 at 14 (1968).
See also Id., SR. 13 at 34 (1968).
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clared over the seabed 43 or that a de jure and de facto freeze of the
44
status quo should be declared with respect to seabed resources.
There were different perspectives on whether the moratorium should
or until agreement
last either until the entry into force of a new 4treaty
5
was reached on the distribution of benefits.
Several draft moratorium proposals were introduced in 1968
stressing the principal non-appropriation, non-exercise of sovereignty
rights, and abstention of any claim or of the exercise of any right,
entitlement, or interest not expressly and internationally recognized. 46 Also, Resolution 2467A (XXIII) declared that exploitation
should be undertaken for the benefit of all mankind. All these initiatives were included in Resolution 2574D (XXIV) which declared that,
pending the establishment of the international regime, states, individuals and other legal entities must refrain from any exploitation of the
resources of the seabed and that no claim relating to any part of the
seabed or its resources would be admitted. The Declaration of Principles reiterated the moratorium and reaffirmed those obligations.
Although the Resolution on the moratorium was opposed by
some countries, 47 and others felt that it would not prevent exploitation4s or that it might lead countries to attempt to expand zones under
their national jurisdiction, 49 it was adopted by a large majority in the
General Assembly.50 Certain countries, among them the United
States, explained their negative votes and argued that the Resolution
was not binding. It should be borne in mind, however, that this is not
an isolated General Assembly resolution but one which is part of an
43. Turkey, General Assembly, First Committee (1528th mtg.) U.N. Doe.
A/C. 1/PV.1528 at 10 (1967). India also referred to the German Proposal at the 1958
Geneva Conference in order to create an international organization, Id. (153 mtg.)
at 5 (1967). For the German proposal, 5 United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea. Official Records 144-45 (1958).
44. Mexico, General Assembly, First Committee, (1529th mtg.) U.N. Doe. A/
C.1/P1529 at 8 (1967).
45. Summary of Opinions U.N. Doe. supra, note 21, at 30.
46. See draft by Liberia, General Assembly, First Committee (1600th mtg.) U.N.
Doc. A/C.I/PV.1600 at 6 (1968) and draft by Mexico, General Assembly, First

Committee (1683rd mtg.) U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1683 at 12 (1969).
47. See France, General Assembly (1680th mtg.) U.N. Doe. A/C.1/PV.1680.

48. Japan, Ad-Hoe Committee, U.N. Doe. A/AC.135/W.G.liSR.6 at 36-37
(1968).
49. Norway, General Assembly, First Committee, (1709th mtg.) U.N. Doc.
A/C. 1/PV. 1709 at 4 (1969). Italy, General Assembly, First Committee (1779th mtg.)
U.N. Doe. A/C.1/P1779 at 10 (1970). (Sweden proposed to replace the concept of

moratorium by that of voluntary restraint, Id., at 4).
50. Resolution 2574D was adopted by 62 votes in favor, 28 against and 28
abstentions. All countries having the technology for exploration voted against it.
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evolutionary process of international law culminating in the Declaration of Principles, which was adopted with no dissenting votes. The
arguments outlined above with regard to the legal value of the Declaration are therefore also applicable to the Resolution on the moratorium.
One may conclude from this process of evolution of the law that
any exploitation of the seabed is prohibited by express legal rules if it is
incompatible with the future regime or, in the meantime, with the
Declaration of Principles. 5' As we have already observed, the fact
that these obligations lack appropriate enforcement mechanisms in no
way affects their continuing validity or the application of the principle of good faith.
IV.

UNILATERAL LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

AND SIMILAR PROPOSALS

Parallel to the development of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, several initiatives have been taken in an
effort to authorize exploitation of the seabed on a unilateral basis.
Most of them have originated in the United States but, as already
noted, some have come from other industrialized countries. These
initiatives can be grouped in three categories: (1) a request for diplomatic protection of investments; (2) national legislative actions or
proposals; and (3) negotiation of a "mini-treaty."
A. Request for Diplomatic Protection of Investments
In 1974 the firm Deep-Sea Ventures sent to the State Department

of the United States a notification of discovery and claim of exclusive
mining rights, requesting diplomatic protection as well as protection

of the projected investments. 52 This request was based on three arguments: (1) the practice of States with respect to utilization of the
continental shelf should allow the application of the same criteria to
the seabed; (2) the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 implies the
freedom to exploit the seabed; and (3) there is no prohibitive rule in
international law.
51. In this regard, see the statements by Brazil, Seabed Committee U.N. Doc.
AiACI38/SC.1/SR.30 at 3 (1970), Id. SR.25 at 98 (1970). See also, reaffirming the
Declaration on Moratorium. Report of the Seabed Committee, U.N. Doc. A/8721. at
75 (1972). The third UNCTAD conference approved Resolution 52(111), reaffirming
the moratorium.
52. For the text of this presentation see 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
51-65, (1975).
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None of those arguments was particularly convincing,5 3 and they
entirely disregarded the work of the United Nations on this subject;
therefore they became incompatible with the legal framework examined above. More important yet, the request assumed legal actions by
the United States, the effect of which would occur outside that country's national jurisdiction.
It is interesting to note that the statement issued by the State
Department in response to the request54 recognizes two important
principles: in the first place, that the development of the law of the
sea should properly proceed through the United Nations Conference
and not through unilateral claims, and, in the second place, that
rights over seabed mineral resources cannot be recognized in areas
outside national jurisdiction. The statement added, however, that the
freedom of the high seas would permit mining of the seabed.
From the viewpoint of international law there is a contradiction
in this regard. On the one hand, recognition is given to the existence
of a seabed area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The recognition of this concept draws directly on the work of the United Nations, particularly the Declaration of Principles, and therefore implies
a recognition that this and other U.N. instruments contain applicable
rules of law. But on the other hand, the declaration that the freedom
of the high seas permits mining in the area disregards the fact that
those same U.N. instruments have established certain regulatory principles, among them the moratorium on exploitation of the seabed.
was, moreover,
In any case, this initiative was unsuccessful. It
55
Government.
Canadian
the
by
completely rejected
B. National Legislation and other Proposals
The most important initiatives regarding exploitation have consisted of the unilateral national legislations enacted both by the United
States and by the Federal Republic of Germany. 56 Other industrialized countries are also considering this approach. Notwithstanding the
complexity of these laws, and even the differences existing between
them, certain basic shared principles and features should be pointed
out.

53. For a critical examination, Biggs, Deep Sea's Adventures: Grotius Revisited,
9 INT'L LAw 271 (1975).
54. Text in 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 66 (1975).

55. Id. at 67-68.

56. The final bill was approved by the U.S. Congress on June 9, 1980 as H.R.
2759, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). It was signed by President Carter on June 28, 1980
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In spite of several references to the importance of the Law of the
Sea Conference, it is considered an essential principle in these laws
that there exists, by virtue of the freedom of the high seas, a right to
exploit the seabed, even in the absence of an international regime.
From the point of view of international law, this position once again
shows the tendency to disregard the gradual development of international law relating to the seabed which has developed in the United
Nations with the support of the governments concerned, as evidenced
by their votes on the Declaration of Principles. Here a new contradiction emerges since on the one hand the freedom of the high seas is
regarded in a traditional light, while on the other the nations also
recognize the concept of the common heritage and its implementation
through the United Nations.
A second feature common to these laws is the unilateral establishment of a regime regulating exploitation activities. The details regarding licensing, protection, and other topics vary in each case, but what
matters is the fact that they call for a unilateral regime. First of all,
this amounts to an implicit admission that the invoked principle of
freedom of exploitation of the seabed is not synonymous with freedom
unfettered by any controls, for otherwise a regulatory regime would
not be needed. In that regard it seems that at least the first stage in the
evolution of the law of the sea is recognized, in which uncontrolled
freedom was subordinated to other exigencies such as conservation.
Secondly, it follows that it is necessary to set up some sort of regulating authority for authorization and enforcement purposes. If such an
authority is conceived as a national entity, it will still be restrictive as
far as the principle is concerned, since it will represent the assumption
that the freedom is, after all, not as absolute as it is argued to be.
The third shared feature is that the laws embody the idea of a
"reciprocating state" which would be establishing similar regimes and
authorizing reciprocal recognition of exploitation licenses. Aside from
the strategic goal of using this mechanism to establish a network of
bilateral recognitions, it also implies to some extent that the freedom

and became P.L. 96-283. See Congressional Record, H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 4631-68 (1980).
For earlier drafts and discussions, see Draft 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
Draft S.713, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); Draft H.R. 136, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1977). See generally, Laylin, The Legal Regime of the Deep Seabed Pending
MultinationalAgreements, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1973).
For legislative background and Congressional information, see Deep Seabed

Minerals: Resources, Diplomacy and Strategic Interest, U.S. GOVT PRINTING OFF.
(1978).
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in question is subordinated to the same rights of other states. This
again shows that it is not an absolute freedom and implies at least
limited and partial recognition of another step in the evolution of the
law of the sea.
Another interesting characteristic that the laws have in common
is that they foresee the possible entry into force of an international
convention on the subject and include some rules of transition. In
particular it is provided that commercial production may begin only
after January 1, 1988, which in principle leaves time for the Law of
the Sea Treaty to enter into force and supersede national legislation.
Also, a revenue-sharing trust fund is provided for in order to meet
contributions required under the above-mentioned treaty. Particularly difficult issues arise from the provisions establishing a grandfather clause and the security of tenure, in relation to the work of the
Law of the Sea Conference and the discussions on interim protection
of investments as suggested by the United States delegation. Even if all
these provisions remain incompatible with the work of the United
Nations, they reveal an awareness that the international community
and the concept of the common heritage cannot be entirely ignored.
The foregoing leads to the conclusion that the unilateral legislative initiatives all suffer from incompatibility with relevant provisions
of the law of the sea in force. 57 Though certain steps in its evolution
are implicitly recognized, these initiatives fail to acknowledge the
most recent and most important one, the one culminating in the
concept of the common heritage. As we have seen, that concept
redefines the principle of the freedom of the high seas by subordinating it to the general interest of the international community as defined
by the latter. Consequently, any unilateral legislation will result in a
violation of law now in force.
The discussion of these laws had also been important from the
point of view of analyzing the attitude of two important sectors,
particularly in the United States: private enterprise and the executive
branch. It is understandable that the private sector should have supported initiatives of this kind, which favor its interests quite generously.58 But the position of the executive branch is more delicate in
57. Chilean Seabed Committee, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.138/S.C.1/SR.49 at 4 (July
1972).
58. See the following statements by various industry representatives: Hearings
before Senate Comm. on Commerce, Foreign Relations, and the Armed Services,
S.713, (May 19, 1976) (Statements Northcutt Ely, Counsel to Deep Sea Ventures,
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that it must take into account the principle of good faith in international law, particularly with respect to the negotiations of the Third
Conference. This point also has a relationship with the problem of the
international responsibility which the governments involved may
have accepted.
When the Resolution on the moratorium was adopted, the State
Department's legal adviser at that time, John Stevenson, who later
headed the United States delegation to the Conference, stated that it
was not binding upon his country but added, "The United States is,
however, required to give good faith consideration to the Resolution
in determining its policies.", 9 As mentioned above, the adoption of a
unilateral law is contrary to the moratorium. Even more serious is the
fact that the good faith of the United States might have been compromised not only with regard to the moratorium, but also with regard to
the United Nations process as a whole, including the Declaration of
Principles and the Conference work.
This was the main reason why the United States Government,
until recently, took the official position of opposing unilateral legislative initiatives, as voiced by representatives of the State Department,6
the heads of delegations to the Conference, 6 1 and the Departments of
Interior, 2 Commerce, 63 and the Treasury. 6 4 Already in 1977, howSystems of Lockheed; Marne A. Dubs, Director of Ocean Resources of Kennecott
Cooper Corp., on behalf of the American Mining Congress); Hearings on H.R. 3350
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, H.R. 3350 (March 17, 1977 and June 1, 1978) (Statement of Marne A.
Dubs). See also, Dubs, An Industrialist'sReaction to the Law of the Sea Conference,
SOUTHERN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (May 24, 1978).
59. 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 831-32 (July 1972).
60. See the policy discussion of the Seabed Committee. U.N. Doe. A/A.C.1381
S.C. 1/SR.64 at 13 (March 19, 1973) and the letter from Charles N. Bower, Legal

Advisor of the State Dept. to Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations (March 1, 1973). A similar statement before that
Senate Committee was made by John N. Moore, Advisor in International Law at the
State Dept. (June 14, 1973).
61. Hearings before the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Comm. (June 4,
1975) (Statement of John R. Stevenson); Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, Commerce and Foreign Relations (May 17, 1976) (Statement of
T.Vincent Learson).
62. Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Commerce and Foreign Relations (May 17, 1976) (Statement of Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary of the
Interior); Hearingsbefore the House Interiorand Insular Affairs Subcomm. on Mines
and Mining (May 18, 1976) (Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, Administrator of the
Ocean Mining Administration).
63. Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Commerce and Foreign Relations (May 17, 1976) (Statement of Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of
Commerce).
64. Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Commerce and Foreign Relations (May 19, 1976) (Statement of J. Robert Vastine, Deputy Assistant
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ever, a change in position first became discernible. This apparent shift
began with the statement that the executive branch did not support
the legislation "at this time. 6 5s Then it was said that the position
could be "revised" in the light of the Conference work,66 and finally
that the executive branch "strongly supported" adoption of the legislation. 6
At some point it was thought that this change in position might
have been dictated by tactical considerations in the context of the
United Nations negotiations, but the enactment of the legislation
proved that the problem is perhaps more profound, and could perhaps
seriously affect the good faith that all nations must demonstrate in
such negotiations. It is difficult to understand how a country could
have approved the Declaration of Principles and be working in the
Conference on the preparation of an international regime, and at the
same time support initiatives that clearly conflict with the legal
framework and the negotiating effort. An additional fact casts doubt
on the good faith of the United States: two United States representatives recently involved in the work of the First Committee of the
Conference made their views known publicly when they left the
United States Delegation, and in so doing propounded the idea of
developing alternative solutions different from those which were in
the process of being developed in the work of the United Nations, in
which they had actively participated.68
It is not surprising that the discussion on unilateral legislation
generated a great deal of controversy in the Conference. The Chairman of the Group of 77 noted that both the moratorium and the
Declaration of Principles are fully in force. 6 9 The head of the United
Secretary of the Treasury, who discussed the decision to support the negotiation of a
treaty). See also, U.S. Seeks Framework for Developing Seabed Resources, TREASURY
PAPERS at 8-9 (June 1976).
65. Hearings before the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizationsof the House
InternationalRelations Comm. (May 17, 1977) (Testimony of Elliot L. Richardson,
Ambassador at Large).

66. Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the Comm. on Energy and NaturalResources (Oct. 4, 1977) (Testimony of
Elliot L. Richardson).
67. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans and International
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Aug. 17, 1978) (Testimony
of Elliot L. Richardson).
68. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans and International
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (June 16, 1978) (Statement

of Leigh S. Ratiner, Counsel to Kennecott Copper Corp.). See also, Darman, The
Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 373 (Jan. 1978).
69. See Statement by the Ambassadorjrom Fiji, Satya Nandau, ChairmanoJ the
Group of 77, U.N. Doe. AIC.62/SR.109 (Sept. 15, 1978). Other statements were
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States delegation has reiterated his Government's opinion on the nonAlthough the debate has
binding nature of those instruments. 7
brought forth nothing new, it did underscore the substantive juridical
problem. Ambassador Richardson has stated that it is possible "only to
impose legal limitations on the national action of a State outside the
limits of its jurisdiction by including them in the rules of international
law." That is precisely what the United Nations has done in gradually
developing international law in this area, with the support of the
United States.
C. Negotiating of a "Mini-Treaty"
A third approach to the problem by the industrialized countries
has been suggested: the negotiation of a "mini-treaty" between the
countries that wish to exploit the area immediately .7 This initiative
is similar to the mechanism of "reciprocating states" mentioned above
in that it leads to a regime of reciprocal recognition of license, even if
in this case the regime is based on a treaty instead of unilateral
legislation simultaneously adopted.
Even though this initiative is technically different from a legal
standpoint, it is just as incompatible with existing law as is unilateral
legislation. Moreover, it can commit the good faith and the responsibility of several states, which would tend to intensify the problems
under discussion. Whether the aggregate of national laws might lead
to the "mini-treaty" approach remains to be seen.

made on March 19, 1979 and, at the Ministerial Level of the Group of 77, on Sept.
29, 1979. After the adoption of U.S. legislation, a number of statements and documents were also issued. See Letterfrom the Chairmanof the Group of 77, Ambassador E. Kanyanya, to the President of the Conference, U.N. Doe. A/C.62/SR.100
(July 28, 1980); Legal Position of the Group of 77 on the Question of Unilateral
Legislation (Aug. 26, 1980); Letter from the Chief Delegates of Colombia, Chile,
Ecuadorand Peru to the President of the Conference Accompanying the Declaration
of the South Pacific Commission of July 22, 1980; the Inter-Governmental Council of
Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) also approved a declaration in Lusaka, July
1980.
70. Statement by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson to the Plenary Meeting of the
Conference, U.N. Doe. A/C.62/SR.109 (Sept. 15, 1978). See also, Statement by
Ambassador at Large Elliot L. Richardson, U.N. Doe. A/C.62/SR.103 (July 28,
1980) (after the enactment of the U.S. legislation); and the debate which followed,
U.N. Doc. AlC.62/SR.130 (Aug. 5, 1980).
71. See Darman, supra note 68. It has also been suggested that there could be
advantages if the conference ends with a "non-treaty." Hollick, What To Expect

From a Sea Treaty, 18
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68 (Spring 1975).
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V.

UNILATERAL LEGISLATION WITH RESPECT
TO THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

It is often argued that it is contradictory to say that unilateral
legislation on the seabed would be incompatible with existing law and
the Conference work without applying that objection to the abundant
legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone. Except for their similarity from the standpoint of legal technicality, however, the two situations have nothing in common.
Since Chile proclaimed its 200-mile zone in 1947, the essential
purpose of all legislation adopted on this matter has been to prevent
the depletion of marine resources by abuse of the principle of freedom
of the high seas. 7 2 In contrast, legislation on the seabed is predicated
on a traditional concept of freedom, even if it partially reflects some
preoccupations with conservation and the environment.
In addition, United Nations endeavors regarding the Exclusive
Economic Zone have produced a certain basic consensus which has
been absent in the seabed discussions. As a result, national laws,
besides having contributed to the formation of the consensus, are
generally in harmony with the essence of the regime created by the
Conference. It would be hard to say the same in the case of the
seabed. Today a case can be made for the view that the Exclusive
Economic Zone, at least on the issue of fisheries, has become part of
international customary law, 73 which certainly cannot be said of the
law regulating use of the seabed.
Finally, it must also be borne in mind that the common heritage
concept represents a special development of the law of the sea applicable only to the seabed, which means that any unilateral legislation
designed to set up a regulatory system is incompatible with existing
law. By definition, we are dealing with a zone outside national jurisdiction; such a zone is difficult to compare with other institutions
which, like the Exclusive Economic Zone, are subject to national
jurisdiction. Someday those relationships may change and the common heritage concept may become coextensive with living marine
resources, as has already been proposed. 74 Although that has not yet

72. See generally, Vicufia, supra note 32.

73. For an examination of the legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone and its
relationship to international customary law, see Caminos, El Regimen de Pesca y
Conservacidn de los Recursos Vivos en la Zone Econ6mica Exclusiva: Implicaciones
Juridicasy Econdmicas, 1 ECONOMIC

COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND INSTITUTE

OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHILE

74. See Vicufia, supra note 32 at 238-41.

97 (1978).
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come about, it is safe to say that the future looks more promising for
international regimes than for unilateral legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The sort of debate we have been examining inevitably arises
whenever fundamental changes in the law are proposed. It results
from the conflict between forces favoring innovation and those defending the status quo. That is why the problem must be analyzed
from the perspective of its historical evolution. In this case such an
examination demonstrates profound innovation rooted in the past.
The United Nations has given these innovations concrete form by
elucidating the applicable concepts and rules of law. Unilateral legislation would seem to have little chance of turning back a process of
this nature.
Furthermore, if the principal aim is to establish a stable legal
framework for the orderly exploitation of mineral resources of the
seabed in which all would have a legitimate chance of participating,
there is no alternative to an internationally-structured regime. Unilateral legislation might perhaps temporarily satisfy some interests, but it
would be incapable of ensuring necessary stability 75and would in the
end create unfavorable conditions for investments.

75. Arguing in favor of the need of achieving a satisfactory compromise at the
Conference, one author concludes: "Failure to make such a change will doom the
Conference and result in destabilizing illegitimate unilateral actions detrimental to
all in the long run." Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FoREIGN
AFFAIRS 598, 629 (April 1977).

